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After nearly two centuries, judicial review
has become an accepted enterprise in our
governmental system. Following the per-
ceived demands of fundamental law, judges-
with some frequency-refuse to effectuate
legislative and executive acts thought to vi-
olate the provisions of our constitutional
charter. To some extent, however, a system
of limited judicial veto poses tensions with
democratic theory. When the federal judiciary
negates an action of another branch of gov-
ernment, electorally accountable institutions
are overridden by elector ally unaccountable
judges. If one accepts the premise that im-
portant government decisions in a represen-
tative democracy are to be made by eJected
officials, broad judicial authority is discon-
certing from the outset.
For the modern American citizen, however,
the problem is more than theoretical. Despite
the many ways in which some see our gov-
ernment as less than truly representative,
American voters cling stubbornly to the belief
that they can show their displeasure with the
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performance of government officials by vot-
ing errant ones out of office. But with the
federal judiciary, citizens are not even allowed
this traditional prerogative. Not only are
constitutional decisions made by judges who
cannot be removed through the ballot, but
also the rulings themselves are particularly
irksome to overturn. Amending the Consti-
tution, as the proposed equal rights amend-
ment has shown, is a slow and cumbersome
process. The congressional authority to reg-
ulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
on the other hand, is problematic and rarely
used.
Of course, some constitutional decisions pre-
sent greater difficulties than others. When a
ruling is based upon an unambiguous and
widely shared interpretation of the constitu-
tional text, the tension between judicial review
and electoral democracy is diminished. A
decision, for example, that prohibits govern-
mental classifications directly burdening ra-
cial minorities is clearly supported by the
history and language of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And
a ruling striking down a federal statute that
limits political expression seems mandated by
the terms of the First Amendment. In such
instances, the Supreme Court can tell dem-
ocratic enthusiasts that it is merely enforcing
longstanding mutual promises made by the
nation as a whole, not by the judiciary.
Decisions based upon the clear and uncon-
troverted dictates of the constitutional text,
however, are relatively rare in modern ad-
judication. Far more often, courts base their
rulings on values other than those unambig-
uously constitutionalized by the framers. Al-
though wiretaps were nonexistent in 1791
when the Fourth Amendment prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures was
promulgated, for example, the Supreme
Court has applied the amendment to limit
such electronic intrusions.
Somewhat more troubling, the Supreme
Court has on occasion "modernized" the
values reflected in the Constitution, applying
the text in ways the framers themselves would
likely have rejected. The equal protection
clause has been employed to eliminate many
aspects of state-sanctioned gender discrimi-
nation, even though the Reconstruction fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment hardly
believed in sexual equality. And practices that
discriminate against the poor-such as the
refusal to appoint lawyers for criminal de-
fendants who cannot afford to pay for them-
have been struck down despite the fact that
the framers apparently thought them accept-
able. Such rulings arguably step beyond a
strict reading of the historical intentions of
our forebears-employing modern visions of
equality, due process, freedom of thought,
and religious liberty rather than those of the
founders. Yet they still claim their genesis,
and thus their legitimacy, in the phrases of
the constitutional charter.
A third category of constitutional decisions
is even more difficult to justify. What is the
constitutional status of a statute that prohibits
married couples from using contraceptives?
What of a zoning ordinance that defines
"family" so restrictively that a grandmother
cannot live with her grandson? Or a govern-
ment program that sterilizes third-time con-
victs? No express provision of the constitu-
tional text seems to bar these governmental
actions. Still, over the course of the past half
century, the Supreme Court has invalidated
such statutory regimes with some frequency.
Rather than the explicit dictates of the text,
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the decisions purport to protect the "funda-
mental" freedoms of American citizens, the
rights thought "implicit in the concept of
ordered Liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
These rulings-recognizing what the Court
has most often referred to as a right to
individual "privacy" as against the govern-
ment-have proven to be among the most
controversial coinage of the modern federal
judiciary. Although the text of the Consti-
tution appears to be silent on the matter, the
Court has extended the privacy right to
include a variety of procreative, sexual, as-
sociational, and family-related choices. The
most notable of these, of course, has been
the freedom of a pregnant woman to obtain
an abortion without substantial interference
by the state.
This News Letter will examine the propriety
of judicial recognition of non textual consti-
tutional liberties. For some, of course, the
notion of nontextual constitutional rights is
nothing more than a contradiction in terms-
something akin to a search for "square round-
ness." Rights are of constitutional magnitude
if, and only if, they are reflected in the four
corners of the document. The Supreme Court,
however, has refused to follow that line. And
other commentators have claimed that the
Court's more aggressive stance is a justifiable,
even essential, aspect of our constitutional
ethos. I will consider first, therefore, the
Supreme Court's efforts to recognize unlisted
substantive guarantees. Then I will review a
sampling of the arguments proffered against
nontextual adjudication, as well as those
designed to support the judicial enterprise.
Finally, I will address some of the tensions
implicated by the judicial recognition of un-
enumerated rights, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's recent refusal to afford
protection to consenting homosexual activity
in the case of Bowers v. Hardwick.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRIVACY DOCTRINE
The strongest foundation for the modern
privacy doctrine is probably the Supreme
Court's decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942). There the justices in-
validated a statute that authorized the ster-
ilization of persons previously convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment two or more times
for crimes characterized as "felonies of moral
turpitude." The Oklahoma scheme challenge
seemed particularly unfair since the "moral
turpitude" standard was used to draw some
puzzling lines. Under the system, grand lar-
ceny was deemed a sanction able crime while
embezzlement was not. In striking down the
statute, the Court noted that the act dealt
with "one of the basic civil rights of man
... marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race."
Accordingly, procreative interests were given
special constitutional status despite their
omission from the Bill of Rights.
The Skinner precedent was bolstered by the
Warren Court's mid-1960s decision in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
In Griswold the Court struck down a statute
that restricted the rights of married persons
to use contraceptive devices. The opinion
found that the regulation impermissibly lim-
ited the right of privacy of married persons.
Although the Court made some effort to tie
the privacy right to the constitutional text,
it ultimately concluded that the right to
marital privacy was "older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older
than our school system." 381 U.S. at 486.
Accordingly, the right of married couples to
choose-free from state interference-to use
contraceptives was held to have constitutional
significance. Two years later, in striking down
Virginia'S miscegenation statute, the Court
ruled in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967)
that the privacy right embraced, at least
presumptively, the decision to marry as well.
In the hands of the Burger Court, the privacy
right recognized in Skinner, Griswold, and
Loving took on a life of its own. First, the
Court ruled in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), that whatever an individual's
rights to access to contraceptives might be,
those rights must be the same for married
and unmarried adults alike. Next, in the
highly controversial Roe v. Wade decision,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), the justices determined
that the right to privacy is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision to terminate
a pregnancy. Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun declared:
The Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right of privacy. In a line
of decisions, however, going back per-
haps as far as Union Pacific R. Co.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), the
Court has recognized that a right of
personal pnvacy, does exist under the
Constitution. These decisions make it
clear that only personal rights "implicit
In the concept of ordered liberty ... "
are Included in this personal guarantee
to pnvacy. They also make it clear that
the right has some extension to activ-
ities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education. 410
U.S. at 152.
Four years later the Court ruled, in Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), that
an East Cleveland zoning ordinance which
defined "single-family" so restrictively that a
grandmother could not live in the same house
with her two grandsons violated the right to
privacy. Declaring that "freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties" protected by the
Constitution, the justices determined that the
zoning requirement was impermissively intru-
sive. Finally, the Burger Court has suggested
at least limited constitutional protection for
a right to treatment for the involuntarily
committed mentally retarded, Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), and a right to
free association, Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
Of course, a plethora of privacy claims have
been rejected by the Court. In Doe v. Com-
monwealth's AI/orney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976),
the Court summarily affirmed Virginia's sod-
omy statute, which makes illegal private,
adult, consensual homosexual activity. Kelley
v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), held that
a policeman does not have a constitutional
right to wear his hair any length he chooses.
The "right" to observe pornographic mate-
rials in an adult theatre was specifically ex-
cluded from the Court's view of privacy. And
ironically, given the contraceptive decisions,
the justices have never ruled that adultery and
fornication statutes are impermissible.
Thus, the Supreme Court has struck some-
thing of a middle ground in its measurement
of personal autonomy. Some privacy rights,
pnmarily those procreative and family-ori-
e~ted in nature, do exist, despite their omis-
sion from the constitutional text. The justices
have refused, however, to expand the privacy
mterest to a general right to be let alone unless
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harm to another is threatened. Many "vic-
timless crimes"-if indeed there are such
things-remain constitutionally permissible.
Yet the essential position on the unenumer-
ated rights issue seems both clear and well-
settled. Though their scope is neither all-
encompassing nor absolute, there are unlisted
constitutional guarantees.
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OR
JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING?
The shortcomings of nontextual judicial con-
stitutionalizing are substantial. In protecting
rights to privacy, the Supreme Court has
described interest in marital decisionmaking,
procreative choice, and similar areas as "fun-
damental" liberties. Of course, people dis-
agree strongly over the fundamental aspects
of being human. Obviously, the Connecticut
legislature that was overturned in the Gris-
wold case did not consider the right to use
contraceptives "implicit in the concept of
order and liberty." Many regard the abortion
decisions as outright denials of the essential
aspects of human liberty. And it is hardly
a fundamental component of the American
tradition to provide access to contraceptives
for unmarried minors.
It is reasonable to question-given the con-
troversial nature of "fundamental rights"-
why the Court's vision of essential liberties
should take precedence over the views of
other governmental institutions. If no explicit
theory or principle supports the recognition
of the various privacy rights, judges may be
said to be enforcing their own preferences
not law. Moreover, if fundamental libertie~
are thought to be constitutionally protected
because they are rooted in American tradi-
tion, why are the courts better able to as-
certain the content of our tradition than our
elected officials are?
In short, critics have claimed that the judicial
protection of unlisted rights is illegitimate.
Judicial review itself, as espoused in Marbury
~. Madison, 5 y.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803),
IS heavily premised on the notion of a written
constitution. Once the justices move beyond
the written dictates of the text, they move
~yond their legitimate powers. Policymaking
IS the bailiwick of the legislators, not the
courts.
Critics also point out that the courts have
not always fostered the wisest policy. In the
mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court's
Dred Scott decision hampered the country's
ability to limit the spread of slavery, while
President Lincoln honed the ideals of the
nation. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court used
its vision of the appropriate relationship be-
tween the individual and the government to
thwart the initiatives of the New Deal. Again,
elected officials, rather than the life-tenured
members of the federal judiciary, successfully
reflected the needs of the citizenry. It is not
reasonable to assume, therefore, that judges
will be wiser policymakers than their elected
counterparts.
In order to ensure democratic accountability,
it is claimed judicial power should be limited
to the interpretation of the express provisions
of the Constitution. Such a strict textual
approach carries obvious appeal. Quite log-
ically, it calls for the enforcement of express
enumerations of positive rights, and those
alone. The source of judicial power is clear
as well-the language of the text. No sub-
jectivity or usurpation here.
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
Still, fear of judicial usurpation presents only
part of the privacy picture. The bulk of the
interests protected in the cases seems some-
how to belong to us as individuals. Almost
intuitively, Americans feel that the intricacies
of their sexual experiences, the particulars of
their lifestyle choices, and the aspects of their
private lives generally are not the business
of the government.
The idea that the state should not intrude
into the intimate decisions of life is a vague
yet persistent notion of our social ethos. It
is not surprising, therefore, that as respected
a figure as Justice Brandeis would refer to
a right "to be let alone" in the "development
of emotions," "sensations," and "faculties "; or
that the Supreme Court, even in the 1950s,
would declare that "outside areas of plainly
harmful conduct, every American is free to
shape his own life as he thinks best, do what
he pleases, go where he pleases."
Accordingly, some advocates have claimed
that many of the interests protected in the
privacy decisions are based firmly in the
American tradition and popular consensus.
This argument appeared in Griswold itself.
Justice Douglas argued there that the marital
privacy rights abrogated by the Connecticut
statute had been recognized even before the
adoption of the Constitution. The American
societal ethos, in short, does not countenance
government interference in the reproductive
decisions of married couples. Others claim
that a broad societal consensus supports the
guarantee of such liberty interests-even
when the legislatures make ill-advised at-
tempts to abrogate them.
Perhaps more successful arguments for con-
stitutiorial autonomy have sought to tie pri-
vacy interests, by analogy and extrapolation,
to the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Rights to individual autonomy are said to
be direct counterparts to the listed protections
of freedom of speech and of religion and
freedom from self-incrimination, unreason-
able search and seizures, and cruel and un-
usual punishments. Like the rights to privacy,
these stated protections are grounded in an
inherent respect for the dignity of self-govern-
ing individuals. Accordingly, reasonable ex-
trapolation from the first eight and the four-
teenth amendments leads to the conclusion
that certain intimate choices are meant to be
shielded from the intrusion of the state.
None of these claims, it can be argued, clearly
carries the day. Tradition, at best, supports
only a small percentage of the privacy rulings.
No even moderately honest view of American
tradition would demand the "liberty" to se-
cure abortions or contraceptives for minors.
Nor is consensus a ready source of consti-
tutional principle. As John Hart Ely has
shown, either there is no existing American
consensus to guide decisionmaking in modern
constitutional disputes or, if there is, the
judiciary is particularly ill-suited to discover
it.
Securing nontextual rights through analogy
to existing ones does at least turn to the text
as the source of constitutional protection. Yet
analogical analysis can focus its attention in
an almost endless variety of directions. While
one critic might find privacy rights through
the demands of equal citizenship, another
could "discover" rigid demands for economic
liberty in the constitutional provisions pro-
tecting economic expectations, such as the
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contracts clause or the taking of property
clause. Moreover, few of the modern privacy
rulings can be based in analogical reasoning
unless fairly loose linkage is accepted between
explicit and analogical rights. If such loose
linkage is acceptable, however, the Court
really asks no more than "Is that what
'American' stands for?"
So arguments for a strict interpretation of
the constitutional charter remain appealing.
Uniess, that is, one takes seriously the lan-
guage of the Ninth Amendment. It declares
that the " ... enumeration of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." According to
James Madison, the principal architect of the
Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment was
designed to lay to rest fears that only those
rights named in the document are free from
government abrogation.
Madison, in submitting the Bill of Rights for
ratification, worried that the listing of various
guarantees would lead inescapably to the
inference that all other interests not listed were
unprotected. Moreover, he worried that the
"essential rights could not be obtained with
the requisite latitude." His Virginia compa-
triot, Thomas Jefferson, responded that "Half
a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot
secure all of our rights, let us secure what
we can."
The Ninth Amendment, therefore, clearly
means what it says. Whether or not it can
be seen as an independent repository of
federal rights, it surely reflects the framers'
belief that fundamental liberties exist which
are not set forth in the text. Constitutional
theorists who insist that only those liberties
clearly set forth in the text are subject to
judicial enforcement thus have understand-
able difficulty with the Ninth Amendment.
The tight interpretive claim is plagued by self-
contradiction. The language of the text is said
to control, except when the language calls
for the recognition of unlisted rights. More-
over, the strict textualist is forced to embrace
the negative implication arising from the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, which Madison
went to such pains to avoid.
As a result, we have few easy answers. The
judicial recognition of nontextual rights poses
dangers of overreaching that are both real
and substantial. A determination that there
are no nontextual liberty guarantees, how-
ever, assumes that infringements of core free-
doms-which the framers would likely have
found reprehensible-must be accepted by
modern American citizens. Neither course is
free of difficulty.
THE BOWERS DECISION
Rarely have these difficulties proven more
apparent than in the Supreme Court's de-
cision this summer in Bowers v. Hardwick,
54 u.s. Law Week 4919 (June 30, 1986).
Bowers involved a constitutional challenge,
based upon the privacy doctrine described
above, to a Georgia sodomy statute. Georgia.
law makes it a felony to perform or submit
to "any sexual act involving the sex organs
of one person and the mouth or anus of
another." Violation of the provision is made
punishable by a jail term of "not less than
one nor more than twenty years. "I
Michael Hardwick was charged with violating
the statute in 1982 by committing sodomy
with another adult male in the privacy of his
residence. A divided panel of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Hard-
wick's claim and invalidated the statute. In
an opinion by Justice White, however, the
Supreme Court reversed the ruling, declaring
that homosexual acts are not protected by
the right to privacy. Thus the Georgia law,
which conceivably can subject either homo-
sexual or heterosexual couples to twenty
years' incarceration for a single private act
of sodomy, was upheld.
Justice White's opirnon expressly acknowl-
edged the dangers of nontextual judicial re-
view. He recognized that rather than mere
legal interpretation, the case called for "some
judgment about the limits of the Court's role
in carrying out its constitutional mandate."
Moreover, he argued quite correctly, the
"Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cogni-
zable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution. "
I Ga. Code Ann., Sec 16-6-2(1984).
Apparently swayed by such dangers, the
majority of the Court ruled that although the
"cases are legion" in which unlisted liberties
have been recognized, the "right" to homo-
sexual sodomy bears no "resemblance" to the
privacy interests sustained in past decisions.
Rather, such sexual liberty is outside the
scope of traditional American freedoms. In
Justice White's words, "until 1961 all fifty
states outlawed sodomy, and today, twenty-
four states and the District of Columbia
continue to provide criminal penalties for
sodomy performed in private between con-
senting ad lilts." Accordingly, M r. Hardwick's
claim for constitutional protection was held
to "fall far short" of acceptable pedigree.
Despite the energetic rhetoric, however, the
Bowers decision is a troubling one. Surely
Justice White's claim that the interest Hard-
wick asserted simply failed to "bear any
resemblance" to those recognized in prior
privacy decisions is disingenuous. Griswold
v. Connecticut recognized a right to marital
sexual autonomy, and Eisenstadt v. Baird
extended the same constitutional shield to
single persons. The earlier rulings in Roe v.
Wade, recognizing a right to abortion (1973),
and Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678 (1977), striking down a state prohibition
on the sale of contraceptives to minors,
protected very nontraditional interests in sex-
ual autonomy. And Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), in which the Supreme Court
ruled it unconstitutional to proscribe the
possession of obscene materials by consenting
adults in the privacy of their own homes,
seemed to offer special judicial solicitude to
at least some actions carried out in a private
residence. Taken as a group, these decisions
seemed reasonably to suggest that an indi-
vidual has a fundamental constitutional in-
terest in controlling the nature of his or her
intimate association with others-essentially
the claim proffered by Hardwick.
Nor is the refusal to recognize even rudimen-
tary homosexual rights the entire Bowers
picture. The Georgia statute, upheld by the
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justices with such apparent ease, outlaws
sodomy committed by anyone-gay or
straight, married or single. The Court point-
edly refused to say that the statute would
be unconstitutional if applied to heterosexual
couples. With its heavy bow to the perceived
morals of the majority of the populace, Bowers
can be read to sanction state intrusion into
the sexual relations of married and unmarried
heterosexual couples with the same vigor that
the decision embraces official regulation of
homosexual relationships. If so, the potential
scenario is even more disconcerting. If the
government has the authority to ensure, for
example, that married couples refrain from
oral and anal intercourse, then, given prob-
able cause to suspect such activity, one as-
sumes that the state may engage in electronic
eavesdropping to prove the criminal viola-
tion. Law enforcement officials thus become
charged with guaranteeing the appropriate
bounds of even the marital bedroom.
Of course, much of the sentiment of the
Bowers opinion assumes that the Georgia
sodomy statute will not actually be enforced
against heterosexuals even though the broad
language will support prosecution. But if that
is the case, the Supreme Court determination
is hardly more reassuring. Read in this
manner, Bowers allows the use of a statute
of general application-despite its language-
to be aimed at only one segment of society.
This judicial endorsement of selective enforce-
ment seems at odds with the rule of law. Even
the Georgia legislature has never indicated
that it means to apply the sodomy statute
only to homosexuals.
Most disconcerting, of course, Bowers ap-
pears to sanction official discrimination
against homosexuals. However the privacy
rulings are interpreted, it is clear that het-
erosexuals have the right to free access to
abortions and contraceptives whether they are
married or single. It is hardly a major leap
to assume that they also enjoy the right to
engage in the activities that trigger the need
for contraceptives and abortions. Yet such
sexual autonomy has now been explicitly
denied to homosexuals. It is difficult to square
that result with the Fourteenth Amendment's
demand for equal protection of the laws.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the judicial recognition of nontextual
constitutional interests seems to continue its
somewhat serpentine path. The justices ap-
parently remain unwilling to make the ex-
istence of all rights dependent on positive
legislative enactment. Yet only those unlisted
interests enjoying substantial support from
the majority of the populace seem to receive
meaningful protection. Our present course,
therefore, perhaps reflects a broader ambiv-
alence concerning the recognition of an "un-
written constitution."
A free society, as Reinhold Niebuhr observed,
requires confidence in the "ability of men to
reach tentative and tolerable adjustments be-
tween their competing interests and to arrive
at some common notions of justice which
transcend all partial interests." The judicial
recognition of nontextual liberties demands
a degree of confidence that such "intolerable
adjustments" can be achieved. No theory,
however, perfectly explains the Court'sac-
tions or serves to cabin wayward justices. But
the judicial measurements of the expanse of
constitutional liberty may contribute substan-
tially to our stumbling societal steps toward
self-improvement. And adjudication may
serve to put flesh on a constitutional ethos
that is the strongest feature of our national
character. If perfect consistency and contain-
ment require the forfeiture of those two
values, they may not be worth the price.
